Federal Court Dismisses Petronas Carigali’s Leave to Appeal: A reaffirmation of the doctrine of Res Judicata

On 4 May 2026, the Federal Court unanimously dismissed Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd’s (“PCSB”) Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal, awarding RM50,000.00 in costs to Kingtime.

This decision marks the final chapter in determining liability in a long-running dispute, reinforcing the finality of judgments and the robust application of the doctrine of res judicata irrespective of the subject matter.

Background

The dispute originated from the use of a Mobile Offshore Production Unit (“MOPU”) SEPAT, featuring a detachable Wellhead Support Structure (“WHSS”), built with Kingtime’s patented technology. In 2018, Kingtime obtained a High Court judgment holding that its patents were valid, and had been infringed by Petrofac, the manufacturer of the MOPU (“Petrofac Judgment”). This was upheld by the Court of Appeal ("COA"). Petrofac’s leave to appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed.

Following this, Kingtime initiated an infringement suit against PCSB, the owner and operator of the MOPU (“Infringement Suit”). In response, PCSB filed an invalidation claim against Kingtime (“Invalidation Suit”). Kingtime’s Infringement Suit was dismissed and PCSB’s Invalidation Suit was allowed by the High Court.

In September 2025, the COA had allowed Kingtime’s appeal and found PCSB bound by the Petrofac Judgment pursuant to the well-settled principles of the law on res judicata and estoppel. The COA’s basis for this was that the COA found PCSB to have privity of interest with Petrofac by virtue of its sufficient degree of connection with Petrofac and common interest in the MOPU. Consequently, the COA found that PCSB, as a privy of Petrofac, is estopped from challenging or relitigating the validity of the patents already upheld in the Petrofac Judgment. While PCSB was barred from challenging the patents, the COA clarified that Kingtime was entitled to pursue the Infringement Suit against PCSB on a separate and distinct cause of action for taking delivery of and using the infringing MOPU — acts which were separate from Petrofac’s infringing acts.

PCSB’s Leave Application: Statutory Rights vs. Common Law Doctrine

In its application to the Federal Court, PCSB advanced thirteen questions of law, seven of which were argued during the hearing. The core of PCSB’s challenge rested on two primary contentions: -

(i) whether the common law doctrine of res judicata and privity of interest can override a statutory right to invalidate a patent under Section 56 of the Patents Act 1983; and

(ii) whether it is equitable for res judicata to prevent a defendant from exercising a statutory right (the Invalidation Suit) while allowing a plaintiff to pursue a separate claim (the Infringement Suit)?

To support its position, PCSB relied, amongst others, on the Canadian Federal Court case of Weatherford Artificial Lift Systems Canada Ltd v Corlac Inc. 2008 FC 1271 (“Weatherford”) and the recent COA decision in Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Singapore v. Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd [2025] 5 MLJ 657 (“Motor Insurers Bureau”) to argue that common law doctrines cannot defeat expressly conferred statutory rights.

We argued that the central question is not whether PCSB was deprived of a statutory right, but rather what the well-settled principles of law dictate: a party or its privy is bound by a final judgment. This is well-established in the authorities of Kluang Wood Products Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hong Leong Finance Bhd & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 193, Seri Iskandar Development Corporation Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan Daya Tekad Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] MLJU 1236 and Gleeson v J Wippell & Co Ltd [1977] 3 All E.R 54 , as referred to by the COA in deciding on the principles of res judicata and estoppel. The COA had already made a definitive finding of fact that PCSB was a privy to Petrofac, taking into account cumulative factors, including PCSB's deep commercial involvement and control over the MOPU Sepat project. Once held to be a privy, a party is bound by the earlier judgment and cannot re-litigate the same subject matter, as doing so would constitute an impermissible collateral attack on a final and conclusive decision.

Furthermore, we submitted that the authorities cited by PCSB were clearly distinguishable from the present facts. In Weatherford, the defendants were permitted to raise a statutory defence of non-infringement because the specific device in question had not been the subject of prior litigation. In contrast, the subject matter of this dispute — the MOPU Sepat — is the exact same subject matter that was already fully litigated and found to infringe Kingtime's valid patents in the earlier Petrofac suit. Similarly, the case of Motor Insurers’ Bureau was inapplicable as it dealt with the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (REJA) and a party's defensive, statutory right to set aside the registration of a foreign judgment. That case did not involve a scenario where a claim was being re-litigated for a second time, nor did it involve any findings regarding the principle of privity of interest.

Conclusion

The Federal Court dismissed the application, holding that PCSB failed to satisfy the threshold for leave under Section 96(a) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964.

This outcome sends a clear message to the industry and legal community: while statutory rights in patent law are vital for public interest, they do not grant litigants or their privies immunity from the fundamental procedural doctrine of res judicata. A party cannot re-litigate settled disputes through the "backdoor" of statutory standing. For Kingtime, this marks a hard-fought and well-deserved end to years of litigation, securing the integrity of its intellectual property.

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